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LMOST thirty-five years ago, the Fifth Circuit, applying Texas
law, affirmed a jury verdict in favor of an asbestos worker
against several manufacturers of asbestos insulation products.1
The court's opinion in Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. has been
haled as an insightful and well-reasoned application of traditional com-
mon law principles in the novel factual context of a toxic tort case involv-
ing latent injuries.2 Throughout the 1980s and much of the 1990s, the
Texas courts continued both to expand the ability of persons injured by
toxic substances to recover damages and to facilitate the prosecution of
aggregate litigation brought by many persons-involving dozens, hun-
dreds, or even thousands of plaintiffs or class members-allegedly injured
by the same course of tortious conduct.
Beginning in the mid-1990s, courts in Texas and elsewhere began to
curtail the expansion of theories of liability in toxic tort cases and to re-
strain the aggressive case management techniques developed by trial
courts in handling mass tort cases. 3 In its 2003 and 2005 sessions, the
Texas Legislature joined the effort, enacting both general and specific leg-
islation aimed at correcting the perceived excesses of the tort system in
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1. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1081 (5th Cir. 1973).
2. See, e.g., Michael D. Green, The Road Less Well Traveled (and Seen): Contempo-
rary Lawmaking in Products Liability, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 377, 382 (1999) (dating "the
emergence of the mass toxic substances litigation era to Judge Wisdom's seminal opinion in
Borel" and noting that although the case arguably "'made' law," "calmer reflection"
reveals it to be an "application of traditional principles in a different context"); Harvey
Couch, In Tribute to John Minor Wisdom: A Small Sampling of Judge Wisdom's 'Other'
Opinions, 60 TUL. L. REV. 356, 370 (1985) (describing Borel as "a paradigm of legal analy-
sis and judicial craftsmanship" and noting that the decision is referred to as "the Magna
Carta for current asbestos litigation").
3. See, e.g., CSR Ltd. v. Link, 925 S.W.2d 591, 593-96 (Tex. 1996) (rejecting exercise
of personal jurisdiction over Australian supplier of asbestos even though plaintiffs were
exposed to and injured by the asbestos in Texas); Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953
S.W.2d 706, 708, 720, 730 (Tex. 1997) (reversing plaintiff's verdict in case alleging that




providing remedies to persons claiming harm from toxic substances and
court access to persons alleging a mass tort.
This trend of retrenchment, chronicled in the past four surveys on toxic
and mass torts, maintained its momentum in this Survey period. For the
most part, courts in Texas continued to discourage the use of class actions
and consolidations to resolve cases involving multiple claimants; contin-
ued to demand specific, published support for allegations of causation in
toxic tort cases; continued to protect defendants from discovery per-
ceived as tangential and overbroad; and continued to define narrowly the
duty of corporations to exercise due care with respect to their employees
and consumers. Whether the courts have finally achieved an equilibrium
in balancing the rights of plaintiffs and defendants in toxic and mass tort
litigation, or whether the courts and legislature still perceive the need for
additional procedural and substantive restraints on such claims, will pro-
vide an interesting topic for the next Survey.
I. TEXAS MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION
TRANSFERS AND PROCEEDINGS
In this Survey period, the Texas Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litiga-
tion ("MDL") established pretrial MDL courts for cases beyond asbestos
and silica litigation, appointing pretrial judges to oversee MDL proceed-
ings for personal injury and wrongful death claims arising from a bus fire
during the Hurricane Rita evacuation and a design defect claim against
automobile manufacturer DaimlerChrysler. This Survey period also Saw
examination of jurisdictional questions concerning the review of pretrial
decisions by the MDL pretrial judges, delineating when that review is
with the MDL panel and when it is properly before the appellate courts.
A. NEW TRANSFER ORDERS
1. The Hurricane Rita Evacuation Bus Fire Transfer Order
In In re Hurricane Rita Evacuation Bus Fire, the Texas MDL Panel
ordered pretrial consolidation of six lawsuits, filed in two counties, in-
volving injuries and deaths suffered when a bus chartered to evacuate
residents of an assisted living and health care facility caught fire near Dal-
las. 4 Because the cases arose from a common incident and would involve
examination of the "same large pool of employees and fact witnesses,"
the MDL Panel concluded that appointment of "one pretrial judge to
handle the cases arising from this one tragic event will further [Adminis-
trative R]ule 13's laudable goals of efficiency and convenience." '5 The
MDL Panel appointed Judge Rose Guerra Reyna of the 206th District
Court of Hidalgo County as the pretrial judge, transferring all pending
and tag-along cases to her court.
4. 216 S.W.3d 70, 71 (Tex. M.D.L. Panel 2006).
5. Id. at 72.
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2. The DaimlerChrysler AG CLK430 Transfer Order
In In re DaimlerChrysler AG CLK430 Litigation, the Texas MDL panel
granted an unopposed motion to appoint a single judge to preside over
pretrial proceedings in three cases filed in three separate counties alleg-
ing that defendants knew of and failed to disclose "a design defect in the
low clearance and construction of the front end of the cars for model
years 2000-2003."6 The parties agreed that appointment of a single pre-
trial judge would serve the goals of Administrative Rule 13, and the MDL
Panel itself determined that the "cases involve common factual issues and
that their consolidation will serve the convenience of the parties and wit-
nesses, and will promote the just and efficient conduct of the actions."'7
The MDL Panel assigned the pretrial proceedings to Judge Robert H.
Frost of the 116th District Court of Dallas County.8
3. The Transfer of Asbestos Cases Filed Prior to September 1, 2003, to
the MDL Pretrial Court
The 2003 legislation creating the MDL procedures applied only to
cases filed prior to the effective date of the act, September 1, 2003. 9 As
reported in last year's Survey, in its 2005 session, the legislature broad-
ened the statute to allow transfer of asbestos cases filed prior to that
date. 10 Pursuant to that statute, the Texas MDL panel transferred all as-
bestos cases filed prior to September 1, 2003 to the MDL pretrial court
supervising the asbestos cases, the Harris County Eleventh District Court
in Houston. 1 The judge of that court, Judge Mark Davidson, now has
pretrial jurisdiction over all asbestos litigation in Texas.
B. ORDERS CONCERNING REVIEW OF MDL PRETRIAL ORDERS
In In re Fluor Enterprises, the Austin Court of Appeals upheld an order
from Judge Davidson, the Harris County asbestos MDL pretrial judge,
remanding immediately an asbestos case to the transferee court because
the defendants waited until just four days before the case was set for trial
to move for a MDL transfer.1 2 Because Judge Davidson's order re-
manded the case to the Travis County district court, the Austin Court of
Appeals had jurisdiction to review the order. Also, because it did not
appear that the remand order was based on a determination that the case
was not a tag-along case, jurisdiction to review the order lay in the court
6. 216 S.W.3d 81, 82 (Tex. M.D.L. Panel 2006).
7. Id.
8. Judge Bruce Priddy now presides over the 116th District Court of Dallas County.
9. Tex. H.B. 4, 78th Leg., R.S. (2003) (ch. 204, § 23.02).
10. Brent M. Rosenthal, Misty A. Farris & Amanda R. Tyler, Toxic Torts and Mass
Torts, 59 SMU L. REv. 1579, 1581 (2006), describing the enactment of TEX. Civ. PRAC. &
REM. CODE § 90.010(a).
11. Union Carbide v. Adams, No. 03-0895 (Tex. M.D.L. Panel Nov. 29,2005), available
at http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/MDLOrders/2003/030895_2J.htm.
12. 186 S.W.3d 639, 640-41 (Tex. App.-Austin 2006, no pet.).
2007] 1347
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of appeals and not the MDL panel.' 3 Although the case, filed in January
2004, was subject to MDL rules pursuant to Texas Government Code sec-
tion 74.163, the plaintiffs failed to file a report as required by Texas Civil
Practice and Remedies Code section 90.003, however, the defendants
failed to transfer the case to the MDL court within thirty days of their
answer, as required by the case management order entered by the asbes-
tos MDL pretrial judge. The defendants argued that new Texas Civil
Practice and Remedies Code section 90.010(b) still gave them the right to
transfer this case. Nevertheless, the court concluded that the provisions
of the statute did not revive the defendants' right to transfer cases after
the deadline in the case management order. 14 The court further held that
section 90.010(d), which provides that cases pending in the MDL court
must remain there until a complying report is filed, only governed cases
already pending in the MDL court; it did not create a right to transfer
cases to the MDL and did not override the procedural requirements for
transfer, including the deadlines in the MDL court's case management
order.15 Although the court acknowledged that the report was clearly
required under section 90.003, it held that "waiting nearly six months af-
ter chapter 90 became law, five months after the case was set for trial, and
until the eve of trial before raising the lack of a report as an issue or
attempting to transfer the case to the MDL proceeding amounts to a
waiver of such a right under the circumstances of this case and as a matter
of equity. ' 16 Thus, the court concluded, the MDL pretrial judge did not
abuse his discretion in ordering that the case be remanded for trial de-
spite the plaintiff's failure to serve the required report. 17
In In re Silica Products Liability Litigation, the Texas MDL panel held
that it lacked jurisdiction to review the pretrial judge's order remanding a
Jones Act case for silica-related injuries to the transferee court.' 8 The
plaintiff sued his former employer under the Jones Act for injuries result-
ing from exposure to asbestos and silica on the ship where he was em-
ployed. The defendant filed a notice of transfer in the trial court under
section 90.010(b) of the Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code based
on the plaintiff's failure to file a report as required under section 90.004
for cases filed before September 1, 2003. Upon the plaintiff's objection
that the Jones Act preempted the reporting requirements, the MDL pre-
trial court remanded the claim to the trial court. The defendant moved
for a rehearing by the MDL panel, but the panel dismissed the motion for
want of jurisdiction, explaining that, under Rule 13 of the Rules of Judi-
cial Administration, the "MDL Panel's appellate jurisdiction is limited to
reviewing pretrial court orders that grant or deny remand on the ground
13. Id. at 643 (citing Tex. R. Jud. Admin. 13).
14. Id. at 644.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 647.
17. Id. at 647-48.
18. 216 S.W.3d 87, 88 (Tex. M.D.L. Panel 2006).
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that a case is or is not a tag-along case."'19 Because remand by the pretrial
court was based on preemption, it was subject to review only by the court
of appeals. The MDL panel also noted that its opinion was consistent
with In re Fluor Enterprises, in which the Austin Court of Appeals deter-
mined that it had power to review an MDL pretrial remand order be-
cause the order was not based on a finding that the case was not a tag-
along case.2 0
C. ORDERS OF THE STATE ASBESTOS MDL PRETRIAL COURT
The Texas district judge overseeing the Texas multidistrict litigation for
asbestos cases, Judge Mark Davidson, issued a remarkable letter opinion
in Richards v. Carver Pump denying the defendants' motion to dismiss a
case brought by a Maine resident on forum non conveniens grounds.21
Judge Davidson first acknowledged that there was "absolutely no connec-
tion between the State of Texas and any element of negligence, causation
or damages," and pondered how "any attorney could argue with a
straight face that the case belongs in Texas."'2 2 But Judge Davidson then
noted that the parties had advised him that if the case were dismissed and
refiled in Maine, the defendants would remove it to federal court and the
case would then be transferred to the federal MDL court in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania. The court noted the federal MDL court's reputation as a
"black hole," and, citing a published opinion describing the federal MDL
court's practices, stated that transfer to the federal MDL would render it
"certain that Mr. Richards ... will die without knowing whether or not
his widow will get a recovery from this case."' 23 With extraordinary can-
dor, the court observed that a "system of justice that would mandate such
a result has nothing to do with the concept of justice," and noted that
under these circumstances it was "unable to conclude that it is in the in-
terests of justice to decline to accept jurisdiction over this case."'24 The
court advised that it might be more receptive to forum non conveniens
motions in future cases "if a waiver of removal to federal court is offered
by Defendants. '25
D. ORDERS OF THE FEDERAL SILICA MDL PRETRIAL COURT
During the last Survey period, United States District Judge Janis Gra-
ham Jack brought national attention to mass tort and toxic tort litigation
with her sharp criticism of silica claim screening practices, suggesting that
19. Id. at 92.
20. Id.
21. Letter ruling in Richards v. Carver Pump, No. 2006-22, 116 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Harris
Cty., Sept. 5, 2006), available at http://www.justex.net/Courts/Civil/CourtSection.aspx?crt=l
&sid=4 (follow "ENC Ruling" hyperlink).
22. Id. at 1.




thousands of claims had been "manufactured for money. '26 In the cur-
rent Survey period, we again find Judge Jack voicing strong words of dis-
approval, this time of actions taken by Texas Attorney General Greg
Abbott, who seized thousands of x-rays that were under the jurisdiction
of the federal MDL court.27 In June 2006, without having requested the
court's permission to access the documents, armed investigators from the
Texas Attorney General's office demanded under threat of arrest that the
depository turn over x-rays and other documents produced in the litiga-
tion and transported the documents from Corpus Christi to Austin. Judge
Jack rebuked the Office of the Attorney General's disregard of the
court's orders and commented that such conduct suggested "an unfamili-
arity with the United States Constitution. '28 After the x-rays were re-
turned, the court ordered the Texas Attorney General to identify the
individuals involved in the decision to seize the documents and those who
had access to the documents. 29 She further ordered that the U.S. Attor-
ney's office for the Southern District of New York, the United States De-
partment of Justice, and the Congressional Oversight and Investigations
Subcommittee be notified regarding the removal of the documents by the
Texas Attorney General and the apparent disappearance of 152 x-rays. 30
II. DEVELOPMENTS IN CASE LAW
A. PROCEDURAL ISSUES
1. Class Certification
During the Survey period, the courts continued to approach mass tort
class actions with the type of skepticism displayed by the Texas Supreme
Court in Southwestern Refining Co. v. Bernal31 and by the United States
Supreme Court in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor32 and Ortiz v.
Fibreboard Corp.33 In Citgo Refining and Marketing, Inc. v. Garza, the
Corpus Christi Court of Appeals revisited a Dickensian class action ini-
tially brought on behalf of property owners against Citgo and other refin-
eries in which the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants' emission of
airborne toxins diminished the value of their property.34 The trial court
certified the class in 1995; the court of appeals affirmed the decision and
the Texas Supreme Court declined review of the order for want of juris-
diction. The class plaintiffs and Citgo then reached a settlement agree-
ment and, as required by the class action rule, sought approval from the
trial court. The trial court refused to approve the settlement, finding de-
26. In re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 563, 635-36 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
27. In re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1553, 2006 WL 2443250, at *1-2 (S.D. Tex. Aug.
22, 2006).
28. Id. at *1.
29. Id. at *3.
30. Id.
31. 22 S.W.3d 425, 435 (Tex. 2000).
32. 521 U.S. 591, 629 (1997).
33. 526 U.S. 815, 838-46 (1999).
34. 187 S.W.3d 45, 50 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2005, pet. abated).
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fects in the allocation of the settlement proceeds to certain class mem-
bers. The plaintiffs and Citgo then attempted to recast the agreement to
satisfy the concerns of the trial court. In the meantime, both the factual
circumstances and the legal context of the case shifted: the plaintiffs set-
tled with the other defendants, Citgo settled with some of the class mem-
bers outside the class action, and the Texas Supreme Court decided
Bernal. Unable to persuade Citgo to agree to an amended settlement,
the plaintiffs sought to enforce the original one, arguing that the alloca-
tion issues had been resolved by the intervening developments. The trial
court agreed and granted summary judgment on the plaintiffs' breach of
contract claim against Citgo. The court of appeals, however, reversed,
finding that the plaintiffs had effectively waived their ability to enforce
the settlement by engaging in "intentional and, indeed, aggressive con-
duct inherently inconsistent with the pursuit of rights" under the agree-
ment.35 In the absence of a settlement, the plaintiffs still had their class
action claims against Citgo; however, the court of appeals remanded the
case to the trial court directing it to reconsider Citgo's motion to decertify
the class in light of the rigorous standards for class certification an-
nounced in Bernal and the changed factual circumstances of the case.36
In Klein v. O'Neal, Inc., the United States District Court for the North-
ern District of Texas denied a motion to convert an opt-out plaintiff class
certified under Rule 23(b)( 3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to
a non-opt-out limited fund class pursuant to Rule 23(b)( 1)( B). 3 7 The
plaintiffs had sued manufacturers and distributors of E-Ferol Aqueous
Solution, a pharmaceutical product, asserting claims of negligence, breach
of warranty, products liability, and misrepresentation, after reports sur-
faced of deaths and serious illnesses in infants who had received the prod-
uct and after the criminal convictions of the defendants for violations of
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. The plaintiffs reported that
during discovery, information regarding the large number of class mem-
bers raised concerns as to whether the funds available would be sufficient
to satisfy all claims. Citing Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.,38 the court observed
that "denial of both Seventh Amendment jury trial rights and Fifth
Amendment due process principles regarding the right to a 'day in court'
are implicated in aggregating mass torts" and emphasized the require-
ment set forth by the Supreme Court that the totals of the aggregated
claims and the fund available for satisfying them demonstrate the inade-
quacy of the fund.39 Recognizing that "constitutional concerns m[ight]
prove less burdensome in the certification of a litigation class" such as the
present case, rather than a settlement class as seen in Ortiz, the court
nevertheless determined that the holding in Ortiz was not limited to set-
35. Id. at 65.
36. Id. at 80.
37. No. 7:03-CV-102-D, 2006 WL 325766, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 2006).
38. 527 U.S. 815, 838-46 (1999).
39. Klein, 2006 WL 325766, at *2-3.
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tlement classes. 40 As the case before the court was not a mature tort and
there was no evidence of jury verdicts, the court rejected the plaintiffs'
argument that the total value of the aggregated claims could be reliably
estimated.41 Further, the court found that the plaintiffs had failed to
demonstrate the size of the fund available to satisfy the claims. 42
In Norwood v. Raytheon Co., the United States District Court for the
Western District of Texas declined to certify a class of radar technicians,
operators, and mechanics who alleged that they suffered injuries as a re-
sult of exposure to radiation caused by radar devices, finding that com-
mon issues did not predominate over individual issues. 43 The plaintiffs
sought certification of an "issues class," proposing that three issues-the
government contractor defense, general causation, and general negli-
gence-be decided on a class-wide basis and the remaining issues be ad-
judicated individually. The court first considered whether the certification
of an issues class would allow the plaintiffs to isolate individual issues so
as to reduce or eliminate the significance of the predominance inquiry.
Quoting from Castano v. American Tobacco Co.,44 the court pointed out
that "each 'cause of action, as a whole, must satisfy the predominance
requirement,"' and that the court "must balance the severed common
issues against the remaining individual issues to determine whether the
common issues predominate .... ",45 In considering the individual issues,
the court observed that potential plaintiffs alleged different injuries aris-
ing from radiation exposure in different geographical locations over a
thirty-six year period through the use of many different types of radar
equipment and radar systems. The court also determined that the applica-
tion of various state and foreign laws would further complicate the adju-
dication of the legal issues in a worldwide class action. 46 Finally, the
court noted that plaintiffs had not shown that the proffered common is-
sues would be central to the litigation.47
2. Consolidation
In this Survey period, the courts appeared hostile to consolidation of
even the smallest grouping of toxic tort cases. In In re Shell Oil Co., the
Beaumont Court of Appeals conditionally granted a petition for writ of
mandamus challenging a trial court's order consolidating for trial the
cases of two petrochemical workers who were allegedly injured by expo-
sure to benzene at the petrochemical plants where they worked. 48 The
court of appeals applied the so-called Maryland factors adopted by the
40. Id. at *34.
41. Id. at *5.
42. Id. at *6.
43. 237 F.R.D. 581, 601 (W.D. Tex. 2006).
44. 84 F.3d 734, 745 n.21 (5th Cir. 1996).
45. Norwood, 237 F.R.D. at 589.
46. Id. at 589, 600.
47. Id. at 601.
48. 202 S.W.3d 286, 272 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2006, no pet. h.).
[Vol. 601352
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Texas Supreme Court in In re Ethyl Corp. 49-including the commonality
or similarity of the plaintiffs' exposure sites, the plaintiffs' occupations,
the time of their exposure, the type of diseases alleged, the type of cancer
specifically, the status of discovery, the identity of counsel, and whether
the plaintiffs were living or deceased-in considering whether the joint
trial of the two cases would be unduly prejudicial. The court determined
that the differences between the plaintiffs' circumstances of exposure out-
weighed the similarities, and that medical differences (the defendants
contended that the two workers suffered from different types of cancer,
and one was alive and the other deceased) also militated against consoli-
dation. While the court acknowledged that two of the factors-common-
ality of representation and the status of discovery-favored
consolidation, those factors were to be given less weight and, therefore,
were insufficient to support consolidation in light of the factual
differences. 50
3. Personal Jurisdiction
In Verizon California Inc. v. Douglas, the First District Court of Ap-
peals in Houston ruled that a California company did not have minimum
contacts with Texas sufficient for the state's long-arm statute to confer
general jurisdiction on the state's courts.5 1 The plaintiff filed a wrongful
death action against Verizon California, Inc. and other defendants in Gal-
veston County District Court, alleging that the decedent, her mother, had
been exposed to asbestos fibers from the work clothes of the plaintiff's
father who was employed by the company while living in California. The
defendant made a special appearance, which the trial court denied, and
the defendant took an interlocutory appeal from the denial. The court of
appeals found that the defendant's contacts with Texas, including its par-
ent company's operation of a Texas office, the physical presence of a cor-
porate officer in Texas, and the issuance of a corporate tariff statement
from a Texas address were insufficient to support the exercise of general
jurisdiction.52
4. Forum Non Conveniens
In Bund Zur Unterstutzung Radargeschadigter E.V. v. Raytheon Co.,
the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas de-
clined to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds a mass tort class ac-
tion seeking damages for injuries sustained by German and American
military personnel from exposure in Germany to ionizing radiation emit-
ted from the defendants' radar devices. 53 The defendants, which were
49. 975 S.W.2d 606, 614-16 (Tex. 1998).
50. In re Shell Oil, 202 S.W.3d at 291-92.
51. No. 01-05-00707-CV, 2006 WL 490888, at *7 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Mar.
2, 2006, no pet.).
52. Id. at *5-7.
53. No. EP-04-CV-127-PRM, 2006 WL 3197645, at *11-12 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 30, 2006).
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incorporated or maintained their principal places of business in the
United States, argued that private and public interest factors supported
dismissal of the case with an opportunity to refile in Germany. With re-
gard to private interest factors, the defendants argued that evidence re-
garding exposure, the German government's knowledge of radiation
risks, and the plaintiffs' awareness of the likely cause of their injuries
would be found primarily in Germany. The court acknowledged that evi-
dence on these issues would be found in Germany, but observed that con-
siderable relevant evidence would be found in the United States as well.
The court also noted that burdens related to compelling attendance of
foreign witnesses and transporting willing witnesses to court would exist
in either forum. The only private interest factor that might favor dismis-
sal, the court observed, was the defendant's inability to implead foreign
parties. Giving appropriate deference to the plaintiffs' choice of forum,
the court determined that private interest factors did not weigh in favor
of dismissal. 54 In evaluating the public interest factors, the court deter-
mined that "'the local community had a substantial interest in' the resolu-
tion of claims of American citizens and El Paso residents against
American corporations," that there was no evidence that a German fo-
rum would be faced with a less congested docket, and that the problems
of resolving conflicts of law and application of foreign law would arise in
either forum.55 Thus, the court concluded that neither private nor public
interest factors weighed in favor of dismissal.56
5. Discovery
In In re Graco Children's Products, the Texas Supreme Court contin-
ued its pattern of confining discovery in a products liability case to the
product that caused the injury alleged in the case rather than allowing
discovery regarding all similar products to expose business practices or
the corporate state of mind.57 In Graco, the plaintiff sued the manufac-
turer of an infant car seat alleging that defects in the harness clip of the
seat failed to restrain her infant son during a roll-over car accident. The
plaintiff sought discovery related to the recent announcement of a $4 mil-
lion civil penalty imposed on the defendant by the Consumer Products
Safety Commission. The penalty was based on numerous defects in the
company's products, but did not identify any violation involving the har-
ness buckles or the car seat at issue. The supreme court concluded that
because the products identified in the sanction announcement were not
shown to be similar to the product that caused the plaintiff's injury, the
discovery request was not reasonably tailored to the relevant product de-
fect.58 Although the plaintiff argued that the documents would allow her
54. Id. at *6-9.
55. Id. at *10-11.
56. Id. at *11-12.
57. 210 S.W.3d 598, 598 (Tex. 2006).
58. Id.
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to determine whether other products had harnesses like the one at issue,
the supreme court determined that there were more narrowly tailored
means of obtaining that information. 59 The plaintiff also argued that such
discovery was relevant to show that the manufacturer failed to test its
products for rollovers, but. the supreme court observed that, because the
defendant had already conceded that fact, additional discovery on the is-
sue would not have a tendency to make consequential facts more or less
probable. 60 Finally, in response to plaintiff's argument that the docu-
ments would provide relevant information on the corporate defendant's
"state of mind," the supreme court acknowledged that the corporate de-
fendant's state of mind regarding a particular product may be discovera-
ble, but it rejected plaintiff's attempt to inquire into every product the
defendant made. 61
6. Jury Selection
In Brooks v. Armco, Inc., the Texarkana Court of Appeals upheld a
defense verdict in an asbestos case, finding that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in refusing to strike certain jurors for cause or in lim-
iting cross-examination of the defendant's counsel regarding his reasons
for striking some panel members. 62 The court of appeals also found that it
was not error for the trial court to allow the defendant a substituted per-
emptory strike in place of a strike that was voided because it was made
on a discriminatory basis. The court added that, even if the trial court
had erred in allowing the strike, the error was harmless given that all
twelve jurors found for defendants, and only ten of twelve votes were
necessary to support the verdict reached.63
7. Admissibility and Sufficiency of Scientific Evidence of Causation
In the last Survey, we reported that in Borg-Warner Corp. v. Flores, the
Corpus Christi Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment in favor of the
plaintiff in an asbestos case, holding that the evidence was sufficient to
support the jury's finding that the manufacturer was negligent and that
the defendant acted with malice. 64 During the current Survey period, the
Texas Supreme Court granted review in Borg-Warner Corp. v. Flores and
heard oral argument on September 26, 2006. At trial, Arturo Flores, an
automobile mechanic, alleged that exposure to dust produced by grinding
the defendant's asbestos-containing disk brake pads caused his asbestosis.
The court of appeals affirmed, finding that the plaintiff presented evi-
dence that (1) the brake products contained asbestos fibers, (2) the brake
products, when ground, can emit dust containing respirable asbestos fi-
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 601.
62. 194 S.W.3d 661, 668 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2006, pet. denied).
63. Id. at 667.
64. Borg-Warner Corp. v. Flores, 153 S.W.3d 209, 215-17 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
Dec. 16, 2004), rev'd, No. 05-0189, 2007 WL 16505784 (Tex. June 8, 2007).
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bers that can cause asbestosis, and (3) the plaintiff suffers from asbestosis.
Based on those findings, the court concluded that there was more than a
scintilla of evidence on causation.65 The court of appeals also concluded
that the brake manufacturer's failure to invest in research regarding the
health effects of asbestos despite the widely known danger of asbestos
was more than a scintilla of evidence of malice supporting the imposition
of punitive damages. 66 The supreme court is currently reviewing the
court of appeals' rulings that the evidence was legally sufficient to sup-
port the jury's findings of causation and malice.
In Dori v. Bondex International, Inc., the Eastland Court of Appeals
affirmed a judgment in favor of the defendant based on a jury verdict
awarding no damages to the plaintiff, notwithstanding the jury's finding
that a design defect in the asbestos-containing joint compound product
manufactured by the defendant was a producing cause of the plaintiff's
asbestos-related injuries. 67 On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the jury's
finding that a design defect caused the plaintiff's injuries required it to
award some damages and that the jury's failure to award damages was,
therefore, against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.
The court of appeals disagreed, finding that the defendant's evidence con-
cerning the duration and proximity of the plaintiff's exposure to Bondex
joint compound in support of its contention that the plaintiff's mesothe-
lioma was not caused by exposure to Bondex was sufficient to support the
jury's finding of no damages. 68 The court also observed that the plain-
tiff's factual sufficiency challenge was actually a complaint that the jury's
answers regarding causation and damages were in conflict, but that the
plaintiff had waived that issue by failing to raise it before the jury was
discharged.69
In Mobil Oil Corp. v. Bailey, the Beaumont Court of Appeals reversed
a judgment based on a jury verdict in favor of plaintiffs who claimed that
their decedent's lung cancer was caused by exposure to asbestos on the
defendant's premises. 70 The primary inquiry on appeal was whether the
plaintiffs' expert opinion that the decedent's lung cancer was caused by
his asbestos exposure was scientifically reliable in the absence of other
indicators that the decedent was significantly exposed to asbestos, such as
the presence of asbestos fibers in the decedent's lung tissue, x-ray evi-
dence of lung scarring, or pleural thickening. The court found one study
cited by the plaintiffs' expert, which suggested that "asbestos is associated
with lung cancer even in the absence of radiologically apparent pulmo-
nary fibrosis,"71 to satisfy the standards of admissibility of epidemiologi-
65. Id. at 215.
66. Id. at 217.
67. No. 11-04-00179-CV, 2006 WL 1554614, at *1, *8 (Tex. App.-Eastland June 08,
2006, no pet.).
68. Id. at *8.
69. Id. at *3.
70. 187 S.W.3d 265, 266 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2006, pet. denied).
71. Id. at 274-75.
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cal evidence described by the Texas Supreme Court in E.I. duPont de
Nemours & Co. v. Robinson72 and Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v.
Havner.73 But the court determined that the single reliable study cited by
the expert was insufficient to raise a fact issue on causation because the
plaintiffs' experts failed to explain other epidemiological studies which
yielded contrary results and failed to negate with reasonable certainty the
smoking history of the decedent as a plausible cause of his lung cancer.
The court concluded that the plaintiffs' medical causation testimony was
unreliable, inadmissible, and insufficient to support the jury's verdict.7 4
Justice Gaultney dissented, opining that a learned treatise offered by the
plaintiffs should have been considered because the defendant failed to
make a specific objection as to its reliability when it was offered into evi-
dence, and finding that more than a scintilla of evidence supported the
jury verdict.75
In Matt Dietz Co. v. Torres, the San Antonio Court of Appeals re-
versed a judgment based on a jury verdict in favor of employee Modesto
Torres, who had alleged that occupational exposure to dangerous pesti-
cides used during farming operations caused his laryngeal cancer. 76 The
court rejected the testimony of plaintiff's expert regarding general causa-
tion because the study upon which he relied for his opinion reported an
increased rate of laryngeal cancer among farm workers generally, but did
not identify any specific substances as having a statistically significant as-
sociation with laryngeal cancer. The court also found that there was no
evidence of specific causation, as no reliable basis supported the expert
testimony regarding the level of the worker's exposure to hazardous sub-
stances, and there was no evidence that his exposure was comparable to




1. Duty to Household Members
It has long been axiomatic that the peculiar characteristics of asbestos
have required courts in Texas and elsewhere to apply legal principles to
fact situations unanticipated by the courts and legislatures that developed
those principles. The tendency of asbestos to cause disease only after
many years following exposure required courts to grapple with and clarify
the "discovery rule" in applying the statute of limitations. 78 The typical
72. 923 S.W.2d 549, 557 (Tex. 1995).
73. 953 S.W.2d 706, 714-24 (Tex. 1997)
74. Mobil Oil Corp., 187 S.W.3d at 774.
75. Id. at 275-80 (Gaultney, J., dissenting).
76. 198 S.W.3d 798, 801-05 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2006, pet. denied).
77. Id. at 804-05.
78. See, e.g., Strickland v. Johns-Manville Int'l Corp., 461 F. Supp. 215, 216-19 (S.D.
Tex. 1978) (applying discovery rule to claims of asbestos-related diseases); Pustejovsky v.
Rapid-American Corp., 35 S.W.3d 643, 653 (Tex. 2000) (applying separate limitations peri-
ods for separate diseases caused by the same asbestos exposures).
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scenario of exposure, involving a plaintiff exposed to dozens (perhaps
hundreds) of different asbestos-containing products during a long career,
forced courts to consider novel issues of causation and apportionment of
damages. 7 9 The synergistic effect produced by asbestos exposure and to-
bacco use presented courts with a new context in which to apply the doc-
trine of comparative responsibility.80
In this Survey period, the Texas courts encountered yet another unfor-
tunate characteristic of asbestos: its ability to cause disease away from
the place where it was used in persons other than the user. In Exxon
Mobil Corp. v. Altimore, the plaintiff alleged that she developed
mesothelioma as a result of her exposure to asbestos brought home on
her husband's work clothes.8' The plaintiff's husband was exposed to as-
bestos while working as a machinist at an Exxon refinery from 1942 until
1972. The plaintiff alleged that Exxon was negligent in allowing her hus-
band to work around asbestos and to leave its premises with work clothes
contaminated by asbestos. Exxon countered that the risk to the plaintiff
was not foreseeable and that it thus owed no duty to protect her from the
risk of asbestos exposure. The jury found for the plaintiff and awarded
her compensatory and punitive damages. After offsetting the compensa-
tory award by the amounts of settlements from other defendants, the trial
court entered judgment for the plaintiffs.
Courts in other jurisdictions have split on the issue of whether a prem-
ises owner or employer could be liable for asbestos-related injuries sus-
tained by a household member of the person initially exposed to asbestos,
with Louisiana and New Jersey allowing such claims and Georgia and
New York finding no liability. 82 The Fourteenth District Court of Ap-
peals in Houston joined those jurisdictions siding with the defendant, re-
versing the judgment and rendering judgment for Exxon on the theory
that the risks of household exposure were unforeseeable until after the
period of the plaintiff's exposure to asbestos. 83 In reaching its decision
the court engaged in a fact-intensive inquiry, framing the question of duty
as "what did Exxon know about the risks associated with asbestos expo-
79. See, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1094 (5th Cir.
1973) (holding that each defendant's product was a cause-in-fact to some injury sustained
by the plaintiff and that defendants were jointly and severally liable for plaintiff's dam-
ages); Gaulding v. Celotex Corp., 772 S.W.2d 66, 68, 7-1 (Tex. 1989) (rejecting theories of
alternative liability, concert of action, enterprise liability, and market-share liability in case
in which manufacturer of product could not be identified).
80. See, e.g., Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Parrish, 58 S.W.3d 467, 475-79 (Ky.
2001), Champagne v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 562 A.2d 1100, 1118 (Conn. 1989) and
Brisboy v. Fibreboard Corp., 418 N.W.2d 650, 655-56 (Mich. 1988) (all allowing jury to
consider plaintiff's smoking as comparative negligence in asbestosis case).
81. No. 14-04-01133-CV, 2006 WL 3511723, at *1 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
Dec. 7, 2006, no pet.).
82. Compare Olivo v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 895 A.2d 1143 (N.J. 2006) and Zimko v.
Am. Cyanamid, 905 So. 2d 465, 482-83 (La. Ct. App. 2005) with CSX Transp., Inc. v. Wil-
liams, 608 S.E.2d 208, 209 (Ga. 2005) and Holdampf v. A.C. & S., Inc. (In re N.Y.C. Asbes-
tos Litig.), 840 N.E.2d 1115, 1116 (N.Y. 2006).
83. Altimore, 2006 WL 3511723, at *8.
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sure, and when did Exxon know it ... ",84 The court concluded that Ex-
xon was not "put on notice" of the risk of exposure to asbestos-laden
work clothes until 1972, when OSHA promulgated regulations prohibit-
ing employers from allowing workers who had been exposed to asbestos
to wear their work clothes home. 85 The court explicitly rejected the
plaintiff's argument that under Texas law, "knowledge of a risk of harm
to someone, creates a duty of care to everyone. '86
2. Duty of Successor Corporation/Provider of Safety Services
In Wortham v. Dow Chemical Co., the Fourteenth District Court of
Appeals in Houston affirmed a summary judgment holding that Dow
Chemical was not the successor-in-interest to Dow Badische and there-
fore was not liable for the decedent's lung cancer and death resulting
from exposure to asbestos at the premises of Dow Badische. 87 On ap-
peal, the plaintiffs argued that Dow Chemical had failed to negate their
claim that Dow Chemical and Dow Badische were a "single business en-
terprise," but the court of appeals did not consider the argument because
the plaintiffs had not pled or otherwise raised the single business enter-
prise theory in the trial court.88 The court added that the plaintiffs had
shown no basis for successor liability because they presented no evidence
that Dow Chemical owned the Dow Badische premises at the time of
Wortham's exposure or that Dow Chemical had ever operated the Dow
Badische facility. 89 The court further noted that the fact that Dow Chem-
ical provided health and safety services to the worker's employer did not
preclude summary judgment because there was no evidence that the
worker's injuries were caused by Dow Chemical's negligence in providing
those services.90
3. Products Liability-Adequacy of Warning
In McNeil v. Wyeth, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit applying Texas law reversed a summary judgment in favor of a
drug manufacturer, finding a genuine dispute concerning the adequacy of
warnings provided for the prescription drug Reglan.91 The district court
had held that the adequacy of the label was established as a matter of law
because the label specifically mentioned the risk of developing the condi-
tion suffered by the plaintiff (tardive dyskinesia). The Fifth Circuit dis-
agreed, explaining that when the manufacturer warns a learned
intermediary of a lower risk than the actual risk, the warning could be
84. Id. at *3.
85. Id. at *8.
86. Id.
87. 179 S.W.3d 189, 200 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 27, 2005, no pet.).
88. Id. at 196.
89. Id. at 203.
90. Id.
91. 462 F.3d 364, 373 (5th Cir. 2006).
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rendered misleading and ineffective. 92 The court found that genuine is-
sues of fact existed as to whether there were significant differences be-
tween the disclosed risk and the actual risk of developing tardive
dyskinesia following long-term use of the drug. In reaching this conclu-
sion, the court found that the defendant was, or should have been, aware
that the majority of Reglan sales were for off-label long-term use despite
product indication for use not longer than twelve weeks.93
4. Medical Monitoring
In Norwood v. Raytheon Co., the United States District Court for the
Western District of Texas predicted that the Texas Supreme Court would
not recognize medical monitoring as an independent cause of action.94
The named plaintiffs sought certification of a class consisting of radar op-
erators, technicians, and mechanics exposed to radiation "but not yet af-
fected with an illness or injury caused by such exposure.' '95 The district
court noted that in Temple-Inland Forest Products Corp. v. Carter,96 the
Texas Supreme Court rejected a claim for mental anguish damages result-
ing from exposure to asbestos in the absence of physical injuries. The
court found the policy considerations cited in the Temple-Inland deci-
sion-difficulty of evaluating the seriousness of the claims, the unpredict-
ability of liability, and the potential competition with manifest physical
injury claims for judicial resources-to be equally applicable to claims
seeking damages for medical monitoring claims. The court also acknowl-
edged the Fifth Circuit's reluctance to create a cause of action not cur-
rently recognized in the forum state. The court thus dismissed the
plaintiffs' complaint for failure to state a claim. 97
5. Constitutional Issues in Application of Legislation
In Robinson v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., the Fourteenth District Court
of Appeals in Houston rejected a challenge under the Texas Constitution
to a statute contained in and passed with House Bill 4 capping the liabil-
ity for asbestos-related injuries of certain successor corporations.98 The
plaintiffs alleged that Mr. Robinson developed mesothelioma as a result
of exposure to asbestos while working on machinery and equipment lined
with asbestos products, including products made by the predecessor of
defendant Crown Cork & Seal. While the plaintiffs' suit was pending, the
Texas Legislature passed House Bill 4 which included a new affirmative
defense limiting the liability of successor corporations for asbestos-re-
lated claims, now codified in Chapter 149 of the Texas Civil Practice &
92. Id. at 368.
93. Id. at 369.
94. 414 F. Supp. 2d 659, 667 (W.D. Tex. 2006).
95. Id. at 661 (quoting plaintiffs' pleadings).
96. 993 S.W.2d 88, 92-93 (Tex. 1999).
97. Norwood, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 668.
98. No. 14-04-00658-CV, 2006 WL 1168782, at *1 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
May 4, 2006, pet. filed).
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Remedies Code. The stated purpose of the statute is to limit cumulative
"successor asbestos-related liabilities" to the total gross assets of the
transferor corporation at the time of merger or consolidation.9 9 After the
statute became effective, the trial court granted summary judgment in
favor of Crown Cork based on proof that already paid out damages ex-
ceeding the cap. The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the application of
the cap to a cause of action that had already accrued was unconstitution-
ally retroactive because it extinguished a vested right. The court of ap-
peals disagreed, holding that the statute "was a valid exercise of the
Legislature's police power and that the beneficial reasons for its enact-
ment outweigh the negative impact on [the plaintiff's] right to address the
untimely death of her husband" and adding that "the Statute benefited
the State as a whole and is not a special law." 100 Justice Kem Thompson
Frost dissented, maintaining that the language in Section 29 of the Texas
Bill of Rights expressly withholds from the Legislature the authority to
enact retroactive laws in violation of section 16 of the Texas Bill of Rights
and finding that the statute in question was unconstitutionally retroactive
as applied.' 0 1
6. Insurance Coverage
In Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Federal Insurance Co., the Dal-
las Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in a declaratory judg-
ment holding that an insurer had no duty to defend or indemnify a
manufacturer of cellular phones in two class actions in which the plaintiffs
alleged that the manufacturer was liable for misrepresentation and unjust
enrichment in marketing its products and services. 0 2 In one of the cases
the plaintiffs specifically alleged that class members had sustained "bio-
logical injury" and "cellular dysfunction"; in the other the plaintiffs dis-
claimed damages for personal injuries. The court of appeals noted that
courts have held that allegations of injury at the cellular level triggers a
duty to defend under the typical "bodily injury" provision in an insurance
contract, while other courts have refused to find coverage for claims al-
leging a mere risk of future disease but no current physical harm.'0 3
Finding these authorities persuasive, the court found coverage for the
class action in which the plaintiffs alleged cellular damage, and found no
duty to defend or indemnify in the case in which the class disclaimed
damages for personal injuries. 10 4
99. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 149.004.
100. Robinson, 2006 WL 1168782, at *17.
101. Id. at *17-26 (Frost, J., dissenting).
102. 202 S.W.3d 372, 374 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, pet. filed).
103. Id. at 383.
104. Id. at 383-84.
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